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ABSTRACT 
This study aimed to investigate the roles of executive processes of inhibition and switching 
and verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities in insight and non-insight tasks. 
Eighteen insight tasks, 10 non-insight tasks and measures of individual differences in 
working memory capacities and executive functions of switching and inhibition were 
administered to 120 participants. Performance on insight problems was linked positively to 
measures of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory storage capacity but not with 
executive function measures. Non-insight task performance was positively linked to the 
executive function of switching and to verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacity. 
The results are discussed in relation to dual process theories of thinking.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This study aimed to investigate the relative roles of executive processes of inhibition and 
switching and verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities in insight and non-insight 
problem solving tasks. 
First, some key terms will be defined. A problem exists when someone has a goal for which they 
are unable to generate a suitable sequence of actions either from memory or by applying a 
routine method. To solve a problem requires representing the problem situation and goal, 
followed by search for an appropriate sequence of actions within the framework of the initial 
problem representation. Sometimes success is achieved within the initial representation. In other 
cases, the initial representation leads to an impasse (Ohlsson, 1992) in which progress halts; to 
break the impasse, the problem representation must be changed or re-structured to allow fresh 
directions of search. A re-structuring that leads to a rapid and complete understanding of how the 
solution can be reached is often referred to as an insight. Phenomenologically, insight is 
accompanied by an “Aha” experience.  
 
Insight has been studied in laboratory conditions by presenting participants with problems which 
initially induce misleading problem representations within which solution is impossible. In such 
cases, restructuring of the initial representation is crucial (Ohlsson, 1992). A classic laboratory 
example is provided by the Matchsticks problem: “Given six matches, make four equilateral 
triangles, with one complete match making up the side of each triangle.” Participants nearly 
always adopt an over-restricted representation of the goal and confine their attempts to two-
dimensional patterns; however the problem cannot be solved unless the matches are used in three 
dimensions to form a triangular based pyramid. Thus with the typically derived initial problem 
representation the goal cannot be reached; with the restructured goal representation, in which 
matches may be used in three dimensions, solution is possible. 
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 Previous approaches contrasting insight v. noninsight tasks 
A number of studies have focussed on examining differences between insight and non-insight 
problem solving processes.  Metcalfe and Weibe (1987) contrasted 5 insight and 5 non-insight 
problems and found that feeling of warmth judgements (i.e. how close participants felt to 
solution) behaved differently for presumed insight as against non-insight tasks. With non-insight 
problems, feelings of warmth predicted solution imminence but with insight problems, feelings 
of warmth were unrelated to solution. Schooler, Ohlsson and Brookes (1993) in a study 
contrasting 3 insight and 4 non-insight  problems, also found a separation between insight and 
non-insight problems in that concurrent thinking aloud verbalisation interfered with the former 
but not with the latter. This result was interpreted as suggesting that insight problems normally 
involved non-verbal processes which were over-shadowed by concurrent verbalisation. 
Jung-Beeman, Bowden, Haberman et al. (2004) carried out  functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (FMRI) and electroencephalogram (EEG) studies of people solving Remote Associates 
Test  items. In these problems, participants are presented with 3 problem words (e.g., pine, crab, 
sauce) and attempt to produce a single solution word  (e.g, apple ) that can form a familiar 
combination with each of the three problem words (e.g., pineapple, crab apple, apple sauce) . 
Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) had previously found that participants sometimes reported 
solving such problems “with insight” and sometimes reported solutions were obtained “without 
insight”. Self described “insight” solutions were associated with primes sent to the right 
hemisphere but not with  left-hemisphere primes. (“Insight” was explained to the participants as 
a sudden “Aha” experience coupled with a certainty that the solution was right.) In the FMRI 
study it was found that “insight” solutions were associated with increased activity in the right 
anterior superior temporal gyrus as compared to non-insight solutions. The same brain area 
showed increased EEG activity beginning shortly before insight solutions were reported 
compared to when non-insight solutions were reported. This work suggests that there are 
differences in underlying neural activity between solving problems with and without insight. It 
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may be noted that in the Jung-Beeman et al. studies, “insight” has been defined in terms of the 
suddenness of solution rather than in terms of restructuring. In solving an RAT item it would 
seem that the participant moves from an initial structure where the problem words are unrelated 
to one where they are tightly related via the solution word, so that re-structuring always occurs in 
solution, but sometimes through a basically sequential procedure (“noninsight”) and sometimes 
through highly simultaneous or parallel processes (leading to experience of “insight”). 
Empirical support for the division of problems as insight v. non-insight was obtained in a study 
by Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) that reported a cluster analysis of problem solving scores for 24 
insight and 10 non-insight tasks. Results indicated that insight problems did tend to cluster with 
other insight problems and similarly non-insight problems tended to cluster with other non-
insight problems. 
Dual process approaches and insight 
Recently, dual process approaches to thinking, which are potentially relevant to understanding 
the differences between insight and non-insight problems, have been developed by Stanovich 
and West (2003), Kahneman (2003) and others. In these accounts two distinct cognitive systems 
are proposed. System 1 is seen as automatic, implicit, not constrained by working memory 
limitations and as generating fast, intuitive responses. This system is assumed to be relatively old 
in evolutionary terms and is very similar between humans and other animals. It comprises a “set 
of systems in the brain (partially encapsulated modules in some views) that operate 
autonomously” (Stanovich and West, 2003, p.182) such as reflexes, instincts, innate input 
modules and processes formed through associative learning. Only the final product of such 
processes is available to consciousness. System 2, on the other hand, is seen as evolutionarily 
recent and is peculiar to humans. It permits abstract reasoning and hypothetical thinking, 
operates relatively slowly and sequentially, is constrained by working memory capacity and is 
highly correlated with general fluid intelligence and with performance on sequentially solvable 
non-insight problems in general.  System 2 processes are impaired by dual task activity but 
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System 1 processes are not. Interference by dual tasks is a signature of involvement of working 
memory as conceptualised by Baddeley (2000) in his very infuential model  and the concepts of 
System 2 and working memory are closely interrelated. System 2 can be seen as incorporating 
working memory as an integral component system involving both storage and executive control. 
Evidence for working memory involvement, particularly central executive involvement may be 
taken as an indication of System 2 involvement.  On this basis, dual task and individual 
difference studies have implicated working memory and hence System 2, in a range of non-
insight tasks such as Tower of London (Gilhooly et al., 2002) and syllogisms (Gilhooly et al., 
1999).  
 
From a theoretical point of view, System 2 processes would be expected to be strongly 
implicated in insight problem solving by approaches which regard re-structuring as requiring 
explicit, executively demanding processes. For example, Kaplan and Simon (1990) proposed that 
insight resulted from explicit search processes at the level of problem representations. On the 
other hand, the original Gestalt analyses of insight  proposed automatic processes which resolved 
“stresses” inherent in misleading representations and led to useful representations free from 
internal stresses. For example, Maier (1931, p. 193) stated: “The perception of the solution of a 
problem is like the perceiving of a hidden figure in a puzzle picture. In both cases (a) the 
perception is sudden, (b) there is no conscious intermediate stage; and (c) the relationships of the 
elements in the final perceptions are different from those which preceded, i.e., changes of 
meaning are involved.” More recently, Ohlsson (1992) and Schooler et al. (1993) have argued 
that insight solutions result from automatic, implicit, non-executive processes such as spreading 
activation. Similarly, Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) argued that insight  “…involves seeing a 
problem in a new light, often without awareness of how that new light was switched on.” (p.14). 
Such views which stress the role of automatic, unconscious, implicit processes in insight 
problem solving suggest that System 2 processes would not be heavily implicated in insight 
problem solving. However, although the role of System 2 in non-insight tasks has been 
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extensively documented, the degree of involvement of System 2 in insight tasks was not directly 
examined until recently. 
 
Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) found a relationship between insight problem solving and the 
Figural Fluency task (Phillips, 1997) which is generally taken to involve inhibition of dominant 
responses and switching of bases of responses. This result supported possible involvement of the 
System 2 processes of switching and/or inhibition in insight problem solving. Similarly, Murray 
and Byrne (2005) in a study using 8 insight tasks reported relationships between insight problem 
solving and measures of attentional switching  and  of working memory storage capacity. 
However, Fleck (2008) contrasted 4 insight and 4 non-insight problems and found links between 
working memory capacity and non-insight insight problem solving and between insight problem 
solving and short term storage rather than with working memory capacity. Fleck concluded that 
these results supported the spontaneous theory of restructuring in insight, i.e., relatively small 
role for System 2 and a larger role for System 1 processes in insight v. non-insight problem 
solving. Ash and Wiley (2006) contrasted insight problems with large and small search spaces 
and found that individual differences in ability to control attention (as indicated by working 
memory spans) was not associated with solving small space insight problems but was associated 
with solution of larger space problems. The results were interpreted as supporting automatic 
(System 1) accounts of restructuring. 
 
The present paper reports a further examination of the possible contributions of specific System 2/ 
executive  processes to insight problem solving compared with non-insight problem solving. 
Previous studies have tended to use relatively broad measures of executive functioning, such as 
Figural Fluency (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005) and working memory capacity (Ash & Wiley, 2006); 
Murray & Byrne, 2005; Fleck, 2008; Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). These measures are broad in that 
the performance on such tasks will be underlain by a number of more specific factors. Thus, Figural 
Fluency is thought to tap both switching and inhibition and working memory span involves 
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attentional control as well as storage. The present study will examine relatively “pure” measures of  
individual differences in the executive processes of Inhibition and Switching in relation to insight 
and non-insight problem solving. The individual difference measures were used to investigate 
whether insight and non-insight problem solving were predicted equally well by measures of 
inhibition, switching , and working memory capacities which were taken to be indices of System 2 
functioning. If individual difference measures show different patterns of relationships to insight and 
non-insight problems, this would suggest that distinctive processes and capacities are involved in 
tackling the various kinds of problems. 
 Previous studies have also tended to use rather small samples of problems (Ash & Wiley, 2006; 
Fleck, 2008; Murray and Byrne, 2005) and/ or of participants (Murray & Byrne, 2005). The present 
study will involve larger samples of tasks (18 insight and 10 non-insight, detailed below) and of 
participants (N = 120). 
  
METHOD  
Problem tasks 
 
The 18 insight problems were taken from Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) and were as follows: Inverted 
Pyramid; X ray; Triangle;Pound Coins; Football scores; Marriage; Matchsticks;. Pigpen; Farm; 
Matching socks; Murples; Candle; Trains and bird;  Earth in hole; Horse trading; Ocean liner; 
Reading in dark;  Lake.  
The 10 Non-insight problems were also from Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) except the Latin Squares 
task (Birney et al., 2006). The remaining 9 were as follows: Tower of London; Syllogistic 
reasoning; Hobbits and orcs; Tower of Hanoi ;Dinner party; Cards; Heavy and light coins;  
Anagrams;  Raven’s Progressive Matrices. 
 Individual difference measures 
 
All individual difference dimensions were assessed by two indicators. 
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Verbal working memory was assessed by  Sentence span( Baddeley, Logie, Nimmo-Smith et al., 
1985)and  Operation span. (Conway & Engle, 1996).  
 
Visuo-spatial working memory was assessed by Visual pattern span (Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley et 
al., 1999) and  Corsi blocks  (Corsi ,1972). 
 
Inhibition was assessed by the Colour Stroop (Ward, Roberts & Phillips, 2001) and the Number 
Stroop task (Ward et al., 2001) In both Stroop tasks the time taken in the control condition is 
subtracted from that in the Stroop condition to indicate the time cost of inhibiting the dominant 
response. 
Switching was assessed by the Arithmetic Switching  task (Ward et al., 2001) and the Number-Letter 
Switching task (Ward et al., 2001). In both tasks, the average time required for the non-alternating  
(non-switching) lists is subtracted from the time required for the switching list to measure switch 
cost. A smaller switch cost is taken to indicate more effective executive switching functioning. 
Participants 
120 students at  University of Hertfordshire were tested. Participants were between 18 and 35 years 
of age (mean age =  22.64 years, sd = 6.38); 68 female and 52  male. Participants were paid £20 for 
participation. 
Procedure 
Each insight and non-insight problem was presented on a separate sheet of paper and participants 
were allowed time to read through each problem once followed by 4 minutes within which to 
attempt a solution. The only exceptions to this were the syllogisms, the Tower of London and the 
anagrams tasks. For the syllogisms participants were given 10 minutes to answer 10 problems 
presented in a multiple choice format. In the Tower of London tasks participants were allowed 2 
minutes on each of 5 problems. Participants were allowed 2 minutes to attempt the 8 anagram 
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problems. Scores for these three tasks were the number of problems correct in the time allowed. For 
the other problems, scores were obtained for whether correctly solved or not and for time to solution 
(non solutions were given a time score of 240 secs). The order of presentation of the problems was 
varied over participants and was such that problems of a similar type did not follow each other 
immediately. 
In the Hobbits and Orcs, the Triangle , the Tower of London and the Tower of Hanoi problems, 
concrete versions of the tasks were provided to work with. For all the other tasks participants were 
allowed to ask questions to which only a “Yes” or “No” answer was provided. Participants were 
asked to propose solutions as soon as they could and time to solution was recorded.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Analyses of insight problems were based on time measures to solution (non solution scored as 240 
secs) because time measures are more discriminating than simple solved/not solved scoring. All 
scores were oriented so that a larger score meant a better performance. For example, times were 
subtracted from 241, thus a quick solution would receive a high score. This procedure should make 
interpretation of the results more straightforward. Analyses of non-insight problems are based on 
standardised latency scores or standardised number of items solved scores, as appropriate.  
Composite insight task scores for each participant were formed by averaging solution speed scores 
over the 17 insight tasks (Cronbach’s α = .77). Similar non-insight task composite scores were  
formed by converting the 10 non-insight task scores into standard scores and averaging these 
(Cronbach’s α = .74). The resulting composites were normally distributed and over the 120 
participants correlated with each other, r =.67** indicating moderate overlap but with considerable 
unshared variance ( c. 55%). 
The raw scores on the two Stroop, the two Switching the two Verbal and the two Visuo-spatial 
working memory measures were converted into standard scores  and averaged to give composite 
measures of inhibition, switching, verbal working memory and visuo-spatial working memory 
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respectively. To facilitate interpretation, the executive function standard scores were then oriented so 
that higher scores indicated more effective functioning. 
 
 Table 1 shows the correlations of the cognitive function measures with composite insight and non-
insight scores.  
< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
The pattern of simple correlations of working memory and executive function measures with 
composite insight scores is similar to that with composite non-insight scores and may appear to 
support the view that working memory and executive function factors play a similar role in insight 
problem solving as in non-insight tasks. However, in view of the complex pattern of intercorrelations 
among the individual difference variables, apparent links may be due to confoundings among the 
variables. To take account of such intercorrelations  and possible confoundings we undertook 
separate simultaneous multiple regressions of the insight and non insight composites as dependent 
variables with the individual difference scores as independent variables. 
 
The results of the multiple regression analyses for insight and non-insight composite scores are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
From Table 2 it appears that when measures were partialled out from each other, insight problem 
solving was predicted significantly by visuo-spatial and verbal working memory while non-insight 
problem solving was predicted by verbal and visuo-spatial working memory and by switching 
efficiency. This suggests that the two types of task are differentiated by the extent to which they draw 
on executive functions, particularly that of switching. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This study sought to add to available knowledge regarding the extent to which insight and non-insight 
problems could be empirically differentiated in terms of involvement of specific System 2 processes of 
inhibition and switching. Previous studies had generally contrasted relatively few examples of presumed 
insight and non-insight problems and the present study used larger sets of problems than had been used 
in single studies hitherto together with a large sample of participants.  
Regression analyses were carried out on composite insight and non-insight score from the 17 insight 
tasks and the 10 non-insight tasks. (Although the overall matrix showed numerous positive correlations 
none were so high as to cause concerns regarding multicollinearity.) The results of the regressions 
indicated that for insight problems, visuo-spatial and verbal working memory were predictive, however 
neither executive measure of switching or inhibition contributed independently. In the case of non-
insight problems, visuo-spatial and verbal working memory  and switching made independent 
contributions to predicting solution scores.  
The results reported here provide further behavioural evidence in support of distinctions between insight 
and non-insight tasks and so add to the differences reported by Metcalfe and Weibe (1987), Schooler et 
al. (1993), Beeman-Jung et al. (2004), Murray & Byrne (2005), Gilhooly & Murphy (2005) and Fleck 
(2008).  
 Furthermore, we found that the pattern of loading of non-insight tasks and insight tasks on individual 
difference measures of System 2 functions differed in an interpretable way. The role of executive 
functioning and working memory in non-insight tasks was expected and has been frequently reported. It 
appears that the insight tasks did not draw on the executive functions of switching or inhibition 
suggesting that insight solutions were based on spontaneous, implicit, non-executively loading 
processes. The significant independent contributions of  working memory scores when executive 
function measures are partialled out, in predicting insight solving, could reflect necessary use of some 
storage capacity in problem solving , as Fleck (2008) suggested, rather than the executive aspects of 
working memory. The previous finding by Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) of an association of insight 
solving with the presumed executively loaded task of Figural Fluency may need re-interpretation. 
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Figural Fluency is itself a complex task which is not necessarily a pure measure of executive functioning 
and it may be that performance on that task also reflects at least some spontaneous non-executively 
loaded processes that lead to new directions of work in producing new patterns. Overall, the present 
results support the view that System 2 processes play a lesser role in insight problem solving than in 
non-insight tasks, reflecting a greater importance of automatic implicit processes in re-structuring as 
suggested by early Gestalt theorists (Maier, 1931) and more recently by spreading activation accounts 
(Ohlsson, 1992; Ash & Wiley, 2006).  
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Table 1. Correlations among individual difference measures and composite scores on insight and non-
insight tasks. Variables oriented so that higher scores reflect better problem solving or more effective 
executive functioning. * p < .05;  ** p < .01; df = 119. 
 
 
                  1.           2    3 4 5 6  
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1.Insight Comp.      - 
 
2.NonIns Comp.      .67** - 
 
3.Inhibition           .18  .21** - 
 
4.Switching       .21** .29** .12 - 
 
5.Vis-Sp Working Mem.  .41** .42** .12 .22** - 
 
6.Verb. Working Mem.    .43** .34** .18* .22** .38** - 
 
 
 
Key: Insight Comp. = Composite score over 18 Insight problems; NonIns Comp. = Composite score 
over 10 non-insight problems; Inhibition = Average z-score over 2 Stroop tasks; Switching = Average z-
score over 2 Switching tasks; Vis-Sp Working Mem. = Average z-score over 2 visuo-spatial working 
memory span tests; Verb. Working Mem. = Average z-score over 2 verbal working memory span tests. 
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Table 2. βweights from simultaneous multiple regressions of individual difference measures on Insight 
and Non-Insight Composite scores.  Variables oriented so that higher scores reflect better problem 
solving or more effective executive functioning.  ** = p <.01, * p < .05; df = 115. 
 
 
    Dependent Variable 
 
    Insight Composite    Non-Insight Composite 
 
    β Wt.             t   β Wt . t 
 
Independent Variable 
 
Inhibition    .09   1.09   .12   1 .44 
 
Switching    .08     .92   .17   2.05*  
 
Vis-Sp.Working Mem.  .28   3.16**   .30   3.44** 
 
Verb. Working Mem   .29   3.26**   .17   1.91* 
 
 
 
Key: Insight Composite = Composite score over 18 Insight problems; Non-Insight Composite = 
Composite score over 10 non-insight problems; Inhibition = Average z-score over 2 Stroop tasks; 
Switching = Average z-score over 2 Switching tasks; Vis-Sp Working Mem. = Average z-score over 2 
visuo-spatial working memory span tests; Verb. Working Mem. = Average z-score over 2 verbal 
working memory span tests. 
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